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NEUROECONOMICS: USING NEUROSCIENCE TO MAKE
ECONOMIC PREDICTIONS*
Colin F. Camerer
Neuroeconomics seeks to ground economic theory in detailed neural mechanisms which are
expressed mathematically and make behavioural predictions. One finding is that simple kinds of
economising for life-and-death decisions (food, sex and danger) do occur in the brain as rational
theories assume. Another set of findings appears to support the neural basis of constructs posited in
behavioural economics, such as a preference for immediacy and nonlinear weighting of small and
large probabilities. A third direction shows how understanding neural circuitry permits predictions
and causal experiments which show state-dependence of revealed preference – except that states are
biological and neural variables.
Neuroeconomics seeks to ground microeconomic theory in details about how the brain
works (Zak, 2004; Camerer et al., 2004; Chorvat and McCabe, 2005; Sanfey et al., 2006).
Neuroeconomics is a subfield of behavioural economics-behavioural economics which
uses empirical evidence of limits on computation, willpower and greed to inspire new
theories; see Mullainathan and Thaler, (2000); Camerer, (2005). It is also a subfield of
experimental economics because neuroeconomics requires mastery of difficult
experimental tools which are new to economists (discussed in further detail in Section 1
below). And to many neuroscientists, the greatest promise of neuroeconomics is to
supply theories and experimental designs for neuroscience. These neuroscientists feel
that the kinds of models and tasks economists use routinely can contribute to systems
neuroscience understanding of higher-order cognition, which are challenging for
neuroscientists who are used to focusing on very fine details of neurobiology and
specific brain areas.
To modern economists, the neuroeconomic approach seems to be a sharp turn in
economic thought. Around the turn of the nineteenth century, neoclassical economists
made a clear methodological choice, to treat the mind as a black box and ignore its
details for the purpose of economic theory (Bruni and Sugden, 2007). In an 1897 letter
Pareto wrote
It is an empirical fact that the natural sciences have progressed only when they
have taken secondary principles as their point of departure, instead of trying to
discover the essence of things. . . . Pure political economy has therefore a great
interest in relying as little as possible on the domain of psychology (quoted in
Busino, 1964, p. xxiv).
Pareto’s view that psychology should be deliberately ignored was partly reflective of a
pessimism of his time, about the ability to ever understand the brain well enough to use
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neural detail as a basis for individual economising. (This pessimism was also manifested
in the behaviourist psychology of Watson and Skinner, who turned attention away from
the mentalism of their time to stimulus-response relations and conditioning.)
As William Jevons wrote a little earlier, in Theory of Political Economy
I hesitate to say that men will ever have the means of measuring directly the
feelings of the human heart. It is from the quantitative effects of the feelings
that we must estimate their comparative amounts (Jevons, 1871).
This turn-of-the-century pessimism about understanding the brain led directly to the
rise of as if rational choice models in neoclassical economics. Models of this sort posit
individual behaviour which is consistent with logical principles, but do not put any
evidentiary weight on direct tests of whether those principles are followed. For exam-
ple, if a consumer’s choices are transitive and complete, then she acts as if she attaches
numerical utilities to bundles of goods and chooses the bundle with the highest utility,
but direct measurement of utility is thought to be irrelevant as a test of the theory.
The ignorance of psychology that Pareto explicitly advocated was cemented by
Milton Friedman’s (1953) development of positive economics. Friedman, and the
many economists influenced by his view, advocated two principles for judging theories
which use assumptions A to make a formal prediction P:
1. Assumptions A should be judged by the accuracy of the predictions P they
mathematically imply.
2. Since false assumptions can yield accurate predictions, even if assumptions
appear false their empirical weakness should be tolerated if they lead to
accurate predictions P.
I wholeheartedly endorse the first principle (1), but not the corollary principle (2).
Here is why: first, if assumptions A are false but lead to an accurate prediction, they
presumably do so because of a hidden repair condition R (that is, (not-A and R)! P is
a more complete theory at both ends than A ! P). Then the proper focus of pro-
gressive research should be specifying the repair assumption R and exploring its
implications, in conjunction with more accurate assumptions.
Second, the importance of making good predictions (1) is precisely the reason to
explore alternative assumptions grounded in psychological and neuroscientific facts.
We do this in behavioural economics because we hope that models based on more
accurate assumptions will make some interesting new predictions, and better predic-
tions overall.
As-if models based on dubious assumptions clearly work well in many respects, and
always will (just as expected value is still a useful tool for some kinds of analysis, even
though it is a severe restriction of expected utility). But tests of the predictions that
follow from as-if rational choice have also established many empirical anomalies.
Behavioural economics describes these regularities and suggests formal models to
explain them (Camerer, 2007).
Debates between rational-choice and behavioural models usually revolve around
psychological constructs, such as loss-aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), the role
of learning and limited strategic thinking, a preference for immediate rewards, and
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precise preferences over social allocations, which have not been observed directly. But
technology now allows us to open the black box of the mind and observe brain activity
directly. These direct observations can only enhance the development of theories
which are based on more accurate assumptions and make better predictions as a result.
An analogy to organisational economics illustrates the potential of neuroeconomics
(Sanfey et al., 2006). Until the 1970s, the theory of the firm was basically a reduced-
form model of how capital and labour are combined to create a production function.
The idea that a firm just combines labour and capital is obviously a gross simplification
– it neglects the details of principal-agent relations, gift exchange and efficiency wages,
social networks and favour exchange in firms, substitution of authority for pricing,
corporate culture and so forth. But the gross simplification is useful, for the purpose of
building up an industry supply curve.
Later, contract theory opened up the black-box of the firm and modelled the details
of the nexus of contracts between shareholders, workers and managers. The new theory
of the firm replaces the (perennially useful) fiction of a profit-maximising firm which has a
single goal, with a more detailed account of how components of the firm – individuals,
hierarchies, and networks – interact and communicate to determine firm behaviour.
Neuroeconomics proposes to do the same by treating an individual economic agent
like a firm. The last sentence in the previous paragraph can be exactly rewritten to
replace firms and the components of firms with individuals and neural components of
individuals. Rewriting that sentence gives this one: The neuroeconomic theory of the
individual replaces the (perennially useful) fiction of a utility-maximising individual
which has a single goal, with a more detailed account of how components of the
individual – brain regions, cognitive control, and neural circuits – interact and communicate
to determine individual behaviour.
The rapid emergence of various dual-self or dual-process approaches testifies to how
well economic theory can be adapted to study the brain as an organisation of inter-
acting components. Fudenberg and Levine (forthcoming) emphasise the struggle be-
tween a long-run player and a short-run player, adapted from game-theoretic models
(see also Shefrin and Thaler’s prescient, 1988, planner-doer model).1 Benhabib and
Bisin (2005) emphasise the constraint that controlled executive processes put on
automatic processes. Bernheim and Rangel (forthcoming) emphasise hot impulsive
states (akin to automatic process, but perhaps driven by visceral factors like drug cra-
ving or hunger) and cold states. Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2004) emphasise
deliberate processes and affective ones. Brocas and Carillo (2005) emphasise how a
cortical control process constrains an emotional process which may be asymmetrically
informed. So far, there is little direct neural evidence testing these various models and
comparing them. Doing so is an obvious immediate direction for research (and will
contribute to basic neuroscience as well).
It is important to note that the focus of neuroeconomic research so far is largely on
microeconomics foundations of consumer choice, valuing risky gambles, and strategic
thinking. It remains to be seen whether neural measurement will be useful for
1 Benabou and Pyciak (2002) show how the Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) model of preferences under
temptation is mathematically equivalent to a rent-seeking competition between two brain areas, linking the
preferential approach to the multiple-selves approach.
C28 [ M A R CHTH E E CONOM I C J O U RN A L
 The Author(s). Journal compilation  Royal Economic Society 2007
understanding macroeconomic phenomena like consumer confidence or stock market
bubbles. However, many of these macro phenomena might spring from the interaction
of many brains that are tightly linked through social networks and common responses
to emotional and news shocks which can be reciprocal or contagious. If so, macro
models could explore how the result of brain activity has a multiplier effect in the
economy.
1. Neuroscientific Facts and Tools
1.1. Facts
Some basic facts about the human brain are useful for economists to know, to
understand the evidence presented below and to provide constraint on theorising.
The brain is weakly modular, in the sense that not every brain area contributes to
every behaviour. (That is, the early phrenologists were on the right track, but had too
crude a concept of how localised complex behaviour or traits like virtue and sloth
were.) While the brain is modular, it is also plastic – responsive to environment as
brain software is gradually installed. Plasticity is most obvious in childhood devel-
opment but seems to continue well into adolescence. Plasticity is the reason why
neuroscientists usually bristle at the term hard-wired, which economists often use
casually.
While neuroscientists often focus on specific brain areas which are cyto-architec-
turally distinct (i.e., they have distinct tissue, neurons, and neurotransmitters), for tasks
economists are interested in the proper focus is circuits of multiple brain areas. The
importance of circuitry also implies that the right kinds of models are computational
ones in which well-understood components collaborate to create behaviour.
Attention and consciousness are scarce, and the brain is evolved to off-load decisions
by automating activity through learning. Automaticity means that people are capable of
creating tremendous expertise which relies on subconscious intuition and pattern
recognition. It also means that overcoming automated behaviour takes scarce con-
scious effort and is often a source of mistakes in Stroop tasks.2
The human brain is basically the primate brain with extra neocortex; and the pri-
mate brain is a simpler mammalian brain with some neocortex. This evolutionary
history is the main reason why experiments with animals are so informative about
human behaviour. (To think otherwise is economic creationism.) For example, rats
become biologically addicted to all substances that humans become addicted to
(nicotine, opiates, alcohol etc.). Our shared evolutionary past, and inherited brain
regions, do not imply that humans always behave like monkeys (though we sometimes
2 In the classic Stroop task, people are asked to name the colour of ink a word is printed in. Under time
pressure, people invariably state the word rather than the colour (e.g., if the word black is printed in green
ink, they say black, not green) at first, though they can learn over time. The Stroop task is now used as a
generic term for any automated response which must be overridden by cognitive control. The game Simon
says is an example. Another example is when Americans visit England. Americans are used to looking to the
left for cars approach them was they cross the street but in England cars approach from the right. Many
Americans are killed every year because of a Stroop mistake. The fact that avoiding a Stroop mistake takes
conscious effort also predicts that Americans whose conscious attention is absorbed elsewhere when they are
crossing the street in England – talking on a cell phone, for example – are more likely to be killed than those
who are not distracted.
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do). Our shared past just implies that when humans struggle to control animal
impulses (such as drug addiction), the struggle is between the neocortex and
older temporal-lobe areas. Knowing which areas are involved in the struggle is useful
for crafting theory and for prescribing treatments.
1.2. Tools
Much of the potential of neuroeconomics comes from relatively recent improvements
in technology for measuring brain activity (particularly fMRI), and in matching older
technologies (such as eyetracking and EEG) with new tasks.
fMRI uses magnetic resonance imaging, popular for decades for medical diagnosis,
at rapid frequencies to measure oxygenated blood flow in the brain (which is corre-
lated with neural input). The spatial resolution of fMRI is about 3 cubic millimetre
voxels and its temporal resolution is 2 seconds. Stronger magnetic fields are unlikely to
provide much more improvement (and may pose health risks, which modern 3-tesla
magnets do not); but improvement may come from innovation in experimental design
and statistics.
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) is an earlier scanning technology which
injects radioactive solution (usually glucose with a radioactive marker). PET temporal
resolution is worse than fMRI (minutes rather than seconds) but glucose is a more
direct correlate of neural activity than blood flow.
fMRI and PET are good for roughly identifying areas that are active in a task. Once
candidate circuits are established, it is useful to ask whether behaviour is changed when
parts of the circuit are broken or disrupted.
Studies of patients with brain lesions are useful for testing hypotheses from fMRI. If a
patient with damage to area X cannot perform a task T normally, then area X is part of a
normal circuit for doing T. (Lesion data are reported below in a study of the Ellsberg
paradox in ambiguous choice.) Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) can knock
out or activate brain areas, and hence is useful for knowing what targeted areas do. The
animal model is also useful because invasive surgeries and genetic engineering can be
done with animals, as a substitute for exogenous lesions and correlational studies in
humans.
A much more detailed level of data comes from recording activity of a single neuron
at a time, mostly from primates (and rarely, from human neurosurgical patients in
whom electrodes have been planted to detect locations of epileptic seizures to locate
surgical targets).
Older tools continue to be useful. The electroencephalogram (EEG) records very
rapid (millisecond) electrical activity from outer brain areas, and can sometimes be
used to interpolate activity in areas deeper in the brain. Psychophysiological recording
(of skin conductance, heart rate and pupil dilation, for example) are cheap and easy
too. Tracking where people are looking on a screen (eyetracking) is also very easy and
useful for many questions economists ask. Directly observing the information people
use to make decisions provides a second dependent variable that can be used, in con-
junction with observed choices, to identify decision rules better than choices alone can.
A great strength of neuroscience is that investigators who have mastered these tools
compete fiercely (for grants, students, and space in Science and Nature); their fierce
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competition creates a bonus for methodological innovation and weeds out weak results.
The tools are also complements because each tool can compensate for the weaknesses
of others (e.g., having an fMRI finding makes data from patients with lesions in the
areas identified by fMRI especially valuable). Recognising this complementarity, neuro-
scientists are most comfortable with ideas that are consistent with many types of data
recorded in different ways at different levels of temporal and spatial resolution. Happily
for economists, many of our simplest questions can be illuminated by the simple
measures (e.g., eye tracking and psychophysiological recording). Ambitious graduate
students interested in this field are well advised to pick one tool that can help answer
the questions they are interested in, and master it.
Neuroeconomics is likely to provides three types of evidence about economic
behaviour. Examples of each type of evidence are given in the next three Sections of
this paper.3 The three kinds of evidence are:
1. Evidence which shows mechanisms that implement rational choice (utility-
maximisation and Bayesian integration of information), typically in tasks that
are highly-sculpted to make decisions that are useful for survival across species
(vision, food, sex and danger).
2. Evidence which supports the kinds of variables and parameters introduced in
behavioural economics.
3. Evidence which suggests the influence of new variables that are implicit,
underweighted, or missing in rational-choice theory.
2. Evidence for rational choice principles
In many simple choice domains, evolution has had a long time to sculpt cross-species
mechanisms that are crucial for survival and reproduction (involving food, sex and
danger). In these domains, evolution has either created neural circuits which approxi-
mate Bayesian-rational choice, or learning mechanisms that generate Bayesian-rational
choice with sufficient experience in a stationary environment, putting to use highly-
developed capacities for sensory evaluation (vision, taste, smell, sound), memory and
social imitation.
For example, Platt and Glimcher (1999) find remarkable neurons in monkey lateral
intraparietal cortex (LIP) which fire at a rate that is almost perfectly correlated with the
expected value of an upcoming juice reward, triggered by a monkey eye movement
(saccade); see alsoBayer andGlimcher (2005).Deaner et al. (2005)find thatmonkeys can
reliably trade off juice rewards with exposure to visual images (including images of
females frombehind and faces of high and low status conspecificmonkeys). Monkeys can
also learn to approximate mixed-strategies in games (Glimcher et al., 2005), probably
using generalised reinforcement algorithms (Lee et al., 2004). Neuroscientists are also
finding prefrontal neurons that appear to express values of choices (Padoa-Schioppa and
Assad, 2006) and potential locations of neural currency that creates tradeoffs (Conover
3 Note that the length of the three Sections is not intended to reflect either the accumulated regularity in
each of the three areas, or likely future results. The last Section is longer because it presents a more novel
perspective, and most directly meets the critique that neuroeconomics does not provide new insight.
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and Shizgal, 2005). Following a long tradition in animal economics (Kagel et al., 1995),
Chen et al. (2006) show that capuchin monkeys respond to price changes, obeying the
GARP axiom, when exchanging tokens for different food rewards.
Another literature shows that Bayesian models are accurate approximations of how
different kinds of sensory information are integrated (Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006).
These data are in sharp contrast with many cognitive psychology experiments showing
that Bayesian principles are violated when intelligent humans evaluate abstract events
(Kahneman, 2003). It is difficult to reconcile these two literatures directly, because it is
difficult to create tasks in which monkeys have to judge the kind of abstract questions
people are asked – like whether basketball players have a hot hand or whether rep-
resentative conjunctions of events (F & B) are more likely than their component events
(F and B judged separately). Common paradigms that can be used across species
represent a huge challenge that would be very useful for either reconciling the results
across species or establishing why they differ.
3. Evidence for Behavioural Economics Principles
This Section discusses four areas in which neuroscience has established some tentative
neural foundation for ideas from behavioural economics which were derived earlier
from experiments and field data. The four areas are: b  d time discounting; aversion
to missing information about probability (ambiguity); nonlinear weighting of prob-
ability; and limited strategic thinking in games.
3.1. Time Discounting
Extensive experiments with animals, and later with humans, established that the dis-
count factor put on future rewards is closer to a hyperbola, 1/(1 þ kt), than an
exponentially-declining discount factor dt. Laibson (1997) borrowed a two-piece dis-
counting function introduced to explain parental bequests, to model quasi-hyperbolic
discounting. In the b  d model, agents put a weight of one on current rewards, and
weight future rewards at discrete time t > 0 by bdt. (When b ¼ 1 the two-parameter
function reduces to an exponential.) O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) dubbed the b
term a present bias and explore its implications. Various field and experimental data
suggest values of b around 0.6  0.8.4 To search for b and d processes in the brain,
McClure et al. (2004) presented subjects with choices between a current reward and a
reward with a one-month delay (which activates both b and d systems), and other
choices with a one-month or two-month delay (in which the b component divides out
and only d remains). They find activity in areas often associated with an emotional
limbic system (medial frontal cortex, cingulate and ventral striatum) when b comes
into play, and find distinct activity in lateral orbitofrontal cortex and dorsolateral
cortex linked to the d system. Their study is hardly the last word – in fact, it is the first
word – but is consistent with discounting being a splice of two processes.
4 Angeletos et al. (2001), Della Vigna and Paserman (2005), Tanaka et al. (2006, http://www.hss.
caltech.edu/~camerer/Growth-nth.pdf) and Brown et al. (2006) all report estimates from savings data,
unemployment data, abstract experiments in Vietnam, and dynamic savings rewards with temptation
(respectively) with b around 0.6  0.8.
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3.2. Ambiguity-aversion
In subjective expected utility theory, the willingness to take bets on events is taken to
reveal subjective probabilities of those events. The Ellsberg paradox showed that for a
small majority of subjects, when two events are equally likely but poorly understood (or
ambiguous), revealed decision weights seem to combine judgment of likelihood and
an additional factor which leads to an aversion to betting under ambiguity. Theories of
nonadditive probability and set-valued probabilities loosely ascribe this ambiguity-
aversion to pessimism or fear of betting in the face of unknown information. Ambi-
guity-aversion has been implicated in home bias in financial investment (a preference
for investing in stocks in one’s own country, or firm, or firms nearby), in robust
control in macroeconomics, and in other economic domains (Hsu et al., 2005).
Scottish law provides a useful practical example. In Scottish law there are three verdicts
– guilty, not guilty and unproven. An unproven verdict results when there is too little
evidence to determine guilt or innocence (often in sexual assault cases, since Scottish
law requires a corroborating witness besides a testifying victim). Unproven verdicts are
usually the jury’s way of expressing an aversion to rendering either verdict, often sha-
ming a victim they believe is guilty but cannot legally find guilty because of evidentiary
rules which create reasonable doubt.
Since decision theorists forming axioms are not generally thinking about brain
activity adhering to those axioms, it is difficult to find descriptions which are suggestive
of neural activity. But Raiffa (1961) wrote:
But if certain uncertainties in the problem were in cloudy or fuzzy [ambigu-
ous] form, then very often there was a shifting of gears and no effort at all was
made to think deliberately and reflectively about the problem. Systematic
decomposition of the problem was shunned and an over-all seat of the pants
judgment was made which graphically reflected the temperament of the
decision maker.
Unfortunately, the seat of the pants is not a brain area, but Raiffa does describe a
rapid emotional response in the face of ambiguity. Hsu et al. (2005) investigated
ambiguity and risk using fMRI; see also Huettel et al. (2006). They found additional
activation in valuing bets on ambiguous gambles relative to risky ones (such as bets on
low-knowledge events, like the temperature in Tajikistan compared to high-knowledge
New York). They found additional activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal area, orbito-
frontal cortex (above the eye sockets, OFC) and the amygdala (a vigilance area, which
is rapidly activated in 5–20 msecs by fearful images, even before they are consciously
processed). Subjects with higher right OFC activity in response to ambiguity also had
higher ambiguity-aversion parameters as estimated by a stochastic choice logit model fit
to gamble valuations.
3.3. Nonlinear Probability Weighting
In expected utility (EU) theory, the utilities of gamble outcomes are weighted by their
probability p. But many experimental studies suggest that people actually weight
probabilities nonlinearly with a function p(p), overweighting low probabilities and
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underweighting probabilities close to one (the certainty effect); see Prelec (1998).
Overweighting of low p could be important in pricing insurance and in explaining
demand for lottery tickets and the high failure rate of new businesses.
Measuring neural activation in response to variation in probability is made possible
by the fact that a fair amount is known about how the caudate (a temporal lobe area
including the striatum) responds to anticipated reward. Hsu et al. (2006) set out to see
whether activation in the striatum responded nonlinearly to probability of winning.
They first presented simple binary gambles (p,X) which have a p chance of paying $X
(otherwise they pay zero) for a few seconds, then had subjects choose between the
presented gamble and a second gamble (roughly matched for expected value). The
choice data enable estimation of parameters of a probability weighting function p(p).
They look at activity in the left and right caudate areas – an area in the temporal lobe
associated with rewards of many types (juice, cocaine, attractive faces, money, faces of
people who have cooperated with you). Controlling for the payoff amount X, there is a
modest nonlinearity of activity across levels of probability p which is reasonably similar
to the nonlinear functions shown in Prelec (1998). This similarity of indirect estimates
and direct estimates of caudate activity is not conclusive proof that the brain is weighing
probabilities nonlinearly, but it is consistent with that hypothesis. A likely explanation is
that probability estimation is a combination of a linear weighting and an inverse-S step
function which sorts probabilities crudely into no, maybe, yes.5 Combining the two
gives a regressive function that overweighs low p and underweighs high p, and is
consistent with the brain activation.
3.4. Limited Strategic Thinking
In game theory, players are in equilibrium when they optimise and guess correctly what
other players will do – that is, when their beliefs about other players strategies match
the actual strategies others choose. Camerer et al. (2004) describe an alternative cog-
nitive hierarchy (CH) theory in which players use various steps of strategic thinking.
Some step-0 players randomise, other step-1 players anticipate randomisation and best-
respond to it, step-2 players best-respond to a mixture of step-0 and step-1 players, and
so on. Since the highest-step players anticipate correctly the distribution of what other
players will do, their beliefs are in equilibrium, but the beliefs of lower-step thinkers are
not in equilibrium because they do not guess correctly what higher-step players will do.
This model (and earlier versions introduced by others) fits empirical data from dozens
of game experiments with many different structural forms (mixed-equilibria, coordi-
nation, dominance-solvable games and so forth).
To look for evidence of limited strategic thinking in the brain, Bhatt and Camerer
(2005) did fMRI of players when they made choices, and when they expressed beliefs
about what other players would do. They found that when players choices and beliefs
were in equilibrium, there was almost perfect overlap in brain activity during choosing
and belief expression – that is, creating equilibrium beliefs requires players to imagine
5 Attention and adaptation probably also play crucial roles. While some risks are overweighed, others might
be dismissed entirely because they are not imagined or attended to. There is no experimental paradigm to
turn on and off attention to low probability risks; having one would be useful, as would field measurements of
actual attention to risks.
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how others are choosing, which uses overlapping neural circuitry with making your own
choice (Figure 1). When players were out of equilibrium, there was much more activity
when making a choice than when expressing a belief (as would be expected from 0 and
1-step thinkers, who are thinking harder about their own choice than they are about
choices of other players). Thus, being in equilibrium is not merely a mathematical
restriction on equality of choices and beliefs, it is also a state of mind identifiable by
brain imaging.
4. Evidence for New Psychological Variables
The largest payoff from neuroeconomics will not come from finding rational-choice
processes in the brain for complex economic decisions, or from supporting ideas in
behavioural economics derived from experimental and field data (as shown by exam-
ples in the last two sections). The largest innovation may come from pointing to
biological variables which have a large influence on behaviour and are underweighted
or ignored in standard theory. This Section lists a few speculative examples. They
suggest that the concept of a preference is not a primitive (as Pareto suggested);
preferences are both the output of a neural choice process, and an input which can be
used in economic theory to study responses to changes in prices and wealth. This view
implies that if we understand what variables affect preferences, we can shift preferences
and shift behaviour (without changing prices or constraints). Whether this can be done
reliably or on a large scale is not yet known. The goal at this point is just to show that
understanding biology and the brain can make fresh predictions about observed
choices. At this point, there are few such predictions and they focus on small effects at
the individual level. But given the youth of the field, having any such examples is
suggestive and they point in interesting directions.
(a)   In equilibrium (b) Out of equilibrium 
Fig. 1. Differences in Brain Activity During Choosing a Strategy and Expressing a Belief About
Another Player’s Strategy (Bhatt and Camerer, 2005).
Equilibrium Trials (a) Show only a Difference in Ventral Striatum (a Reward Anticipation
Area). Out-of-equilibrium Trials (b) Show Stronger Activity in Choosing than in Belief
Expression (Highlighting Paracingulate and Dorsolateral Prefrontal (DLPFC) areas), which
Suggests Subjects are not Reasoning Strategically About Other Players.
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1. In the ambiguity study described in the last Section (Hsu et al., 2005), there
is a modest correlation of right OFC activity with a parameter characterising
the degree of ambiguity-aversion, which is derived from estimation using
choices. (The parameter c is derived implicitly from the weight (E(p)c) given
to an event with expected or diffuse-prior probability p. The value c ¼ 1 is
ambiguity-neutrality. A value c > 1 corresponds to ambiguity-aversion; an
ambiguity-averse person acts as if the decision weight on an ambiguous event
is lower than its expected probability.) One can extrapolate statistically from
the correlation between OFC activation and c in normal subjects to infer the
behavioural value of c that would be revealed by choices of a person with no
OFC activity at all – due to a lesion in that area, say (see Figure 2). The
extrapolated estimate is c ¼ 0.85 (roughly ambiguity-neutral, given sampling
error). In fact, Hsu et al. also tested Ellsberg-type problems on patients with
OFC damage subsuming the areas observed in fMRI. Those patients choices
exhibited a value of c ¼ 0.82. I would love to say this value was truly pre-
dicted before the fact, but it was not (both studies were conducted in par-
allel). In any case, there is a close link between the behavioural parameter
predicted by extrapolating from the fMRI evidence to patients with no
activity, and the extrapolated parameter is close to the figure revealed by
R = 0.55
Y = 0.85
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Fig. 2. Correlation Between Individual-specific Ambiguity-aversion Parameters c Estimated from Choices
(x-axis, Higher c is more Ambiguity-aversion) and Differential Activity in Right Orbitofrontal cortex in
Ambiguous vs. Risky Gamble Evaluation (y-axis).
Positive correlation (r ¼ 0.55) Indicates more ambiguity-averse people have more differential
activity in ROFC. Extrapolating to a person with no OFC activity (y ¼ 0) gives an inferred
ambiguity-aversion c of 0.85. The actual behavioural parameter derived from choices of
patients with OFC lesions was c ¼ 0.82.
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choices. While this correspondence could be construed as consistent with
axiomatic theories of ambiguity-aversion, no theory would have predicted it
without the fMRI evidence to tell us what lesion patients would be roughly
ambiguity-neutral.
2. Wang et al. (2006) studied experimentally a classic biased-transmission game
that has been widely used in economics and political science. In this game, a
sender observes a state S, an integer from 1 to 5 (uniformly distributed). The
sender then chooses an integer message M from 1 to 5. A receiver knows the
setup of the game, and learns the message, but does not know the true state
directly. The receiver then chooses an action A from 1 to 5. (The game is like
security analysts who know more about the value of a stock than you do, make
a recommendation, and want you to act as if the stock is more valuable than it
is, because of career concerns or other collateral interests.) In the interesting
conditions, the senders earn the most if the receiver chooses S þ b, where b is
a known bias parameter (either 1 or 2). We try to predict the true state from
the sender’s message M, and from their pupil dilation (expansion of pupils)
when they send their message. Pupils dilate under arousal, stress and
deception (that is why poker players wear sunglasses if they are allowed to).
Statistical tests show that measuring the pupil dilation improves substantially
in predicting what the true state is. Thus, a biological variable helps infer
private information which is conveyed by messages, in a way that is not
explicitly predicted by conventional game theory.
3. Sanfey et al. (2003) used fMRI to see what areas were differentially active in
the brains of responders in an ultimatum game, when the responders re-
ceived a fair offer ($4  5 out of $10) compared to an unfair offer ($1  2).
They found activation in the insula (a discomfort or disgust area, perhaps
measuring the emotional reaction to getting a low offer), dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (DLPFC, a planning and evaluation area), and anterior cin-
gulate (a conflict-resolution area). They also found that whether people
rejected low offers or not could be predicted with some accuracy from whe-
ther the insula was more active than DLPFC or vice versa. Building on this
study, Wout et al. (2005) and Knoch et al. (2006) used repetitive TMS to
disrupt the DLPFC when people received offers. Based on the fMRI evidence,
they hypothesised that if the DLPFC is disrupted, the socialised response to
unfairness which leads to rejection may be turned off, so that people will
exhibit more innate selfishness and accept lower offers more often. Their
prediction was correct. The effects are small and come from only two studies
with modest sample sizes, but they show the power of a two-step process: first
establish parts of neural circuitry that implement a behaviour; then stimulate
or disrupt some of those parts and if see if you can cause a behavioural change.
4. Oxytocin is a powerful hormone in social bonding (e.g., it surges when
mothers breast-feed; and synthetic oxytocin – pitocin – is administered in
American hospitals to stimulate childbirth). Direct measurement from blood
samples (Zak et al., 2005) suggests oxytocin is important in trust. Inspired by
this evidence, Kosfeld et al. (2005) had subjects play a trust game in which one
player could choose whether to invest money or keep it. If she invested, the
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money doubled in amount and the responder player (the trustee) could
decide how much to repay and how much to keep. Half the subjects were
given a synthetic oxytocin dose (three puffs in each nostril, then wait an
hour) and half were given a placebo so the subjects could not tell whether
they got the real pitocin or nothing. Kosfeld et al hypothesised that oxytocin
would increase trust, and it did. Game theory makes predictions about
structural variables that might increase trust – most reliably, whether the
game is repeated or played once (which does have a strong impact; e.g.,
Chong et al. (forthcoming). But nothing in game theory would have predicted
the effect of synthetic oxytocin.
5. Conclusion
The goal of neuroeconomics is to ground economic theory in details of how the brain
works in decision making, strategic thinking, and exchange. One way to achieve this is
to observe processes and constructs which are typically considered unobservable, to
decide between many theories of behavioural anomalies like risk aversion, altruistic
punishment, and reciprocity.
I have presented examples in which neuroeconomic evidence points to any of three
conclusions. Sometimes rational-choice processes are clearly evident in brain activity
(LIP neurons that fire at rates almost exactly linear in expected reward). In other cases,
the variables or differences predicted by behavioural economics models are evident – in
b  d discounting, ambiguity-aversion and nonlinear probability weighting. In still
another case, perhaps the most innovative, variables that are not a traditional focus of
economic theory have perceptible effects and, sometimes, strong effects: patients with
OFC damage are unusually ambiguity-neutral (which is consistent with fMRI evidence
identifying the OFC as a locus of ambiguity-aversion processing); pupil dilation helps
predict a player’s private information when they might be lying; stimulating DLPFC
increases acceptance of low ultimatum offers (because earlier fMRI work showed
DLPFC activity is correlated with acceptance); and administering oxytocin makes
people more trusting.
Thinking about how the brain implements economic decisions, compared to
thinking about choices resulting from preference and belief, is like switching from
watching TV in black and white to watching in colour – there are so many more
variables to think about. For economic theorists, a natural way to think about these
phenomena is that many biological state variables influence preferences; given those
state-dependent preferences, prices and budget constraints have familiar influences.
I agree with this view, except that we will never fully understand the nature of
the state-dependence without facts from psychology and neuroscience. Further-
more, it is not clear whether subjects are aware of exogenous influences that alter
these internal states and how the state-dependence works when a lot of money is on
the line (arousal itself can be a big state variable) and when agents are highly
experienced.
There is much obvious future research. One path is to study the multiple-process
approaches seriously and look for those processes directly in the brain, or as they are
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manifested in behavioural experiments.6 Another is to search for evidence of distinc-
tions that are well-established in behavioural economics (such as gain-loss differences,
framing effects, emotional foundations of inequality-aversion or social image, and so
forth). A more unifying approach is to take the revealed-preference model seriously
and see how far its language can be stretched to accommodate neural evidence, while
making new predictions rather than just giving economic names to neural processes.
6. Afterword and Prologue: The Mindless Critique, and a Reply from the Past
Some economists feel that the central theory in economics – revelation of inherently
unobservable preferences and beliefs by observed choices – is immune to empirical
evidence from neuroeconomics. Their argument is that economics is only about
explaining choices, and neural evidence is not choices. For example, Gul and Pesen-
dorfer (2005) suggest one categorisation of economics (which could be called eco-
nomicsTM, because they so sharply legislate what economics is and is not). They write7
. . .the requirement that economicTM theories simultaneously account for
economicTM data and brain imaging data places an unreasonable burden on
economicTM theories (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2005)
Some of the examples in Sections 3 and 4 were judiciously chosen to address pre-
cisely this critique. Theories of b  d time discounting and nonlinear p(p) probability
weighting can account for both behavioural data from many choice experiments (and
many field data too) and are consistent with tentative evidence of neural activity. Since
such theories are possible, is it really an unreasonable burden to ask whether other
theories can do the same? Of course, theories that spring from the fertile mind of a
theorist who is simply inspired by psychology, but is not beholden to a large body of
facts, could prove to be useful theories too. But theories that can explain neural facts
and choices should have some advantage over theories which explain only choices, if
they are comparably tractable.
More fundamentally, the argument against neuroeconomics (or the case for mindless
economics, as their paper’s title calls it) rests mostly on an interesting hope, and rests a
little bit on the history of economic thought. The hope is that all anomalies produced by
behavioural economics and neuroeconomics can be explained (if not predicted) by the
enriched language of economics – preferences, beliefs, and imperfect information and
constraint. I share that hope, but only if some imperfections and constraints are allowed
to be located in the brain – in which case, brain evidence is useful for understanding
those imperfections and constraints and suggesting the best models of them.
6 For example, the Bernheim-Rangel, Fudenberg-Levine, and b  d time preference models all predict
that subjects who are tempted by immediate rewards will make different decisions if current choices are not
consumed until a time sufficiently far in the future (so that the hot self, short-run player, or present-biased
current player’s myopic preferences are disabled). Brown et al. (2006) find the first direct evidence of such an
effect in dynamic savings experiments, when thirsty subjects decide how much of a thirst-slaking beverage to
consume. When subjects have to order in advance, by making choices at period t which are not consumed
until period t þ 10, they consume less and earn more overall rewards. Calibrating b  d parameters to actual
decisions yields sensible estimates of d ¼ 0.90 and b ¼ 0.620.72 (the latter depends on whether agents
are sophisticated about their present bias, or naı¨ve).
7 In the passages quoted from their paper, of course, the TM superscripts do not appear.
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A useful focus for debate is therefore how gracefully (and predictively) conventional
economics language can explain the effects on observed choices (and inferred unob-
servable states) of brain lesions, pupil dilation, TMS stimulation, and oxytocin. Any
conventional accounts which absorb these effects semantically, and then make pre-
dictions about them, will be welcomed as interesting neuroeconomics.
The history of economic thought part of the mindless case is more clearly settled.
Gul and Pesendorfer write that Populating economicTM models with flesh-and-blood
human beings was never the objective of economistsTM. But Colander (2005) reminds
us how interested classical economists were in measuring concepts like utility directly,
before Pareto and the neoclassicals gave up.
Edgeworth dreamed of a hedonimeter that could measure utility directly; Ramsey
fantasised about a psychogalvanometer; and Irving Fisher wrote extensively, and with a
time lag due to frustration, about how utility could be measured directly. Edgeworth
wrote:
. . . imagine an ideally perfect instrument, a psychophysical machine, con-
tinually registering the height of pleasure experienced by an individual . . .
From moment to moment the hedonimeter varies; the delicate index now
flickering with the flutter of the passions, now steadied by intellectual activity,
low sunk whole hours in the neighbourhood of zero, or momentarily springing
up towards infinity . . .
The interest of these early economists in measuring utility directly was to establish a
biological cardinal utility scale, which is not a goal of microeconomics. In any case,
given their ambitions, it is hard to believe at least some of these important figures
would not be interested in using the modern tools that we do have. If Edgeworth were
alive today, would he just be making boxes, or also recording the brain?
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